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Abstract 
Most studies on cyclical fiscal policy ignore statutory taxes due to a lack of data. In 
this paper I build on singular data on statutory tax rates in Israel, in order to study how 
they are changed by the government in expansions and recessions. After 
differentiating between ideological (exogenous) tax changes, to those that react to the 
cycle (endogenous) using Romer and Romer (2010) technique, I check whether 
endogenous statutory tax rates are a-cyclical or counter-cyclical, as recommended by 
theoretical models. I found that while direct taxes are a-cyclical, indirect taxes (and in 
particular VAT) are changed procyclically. A pseudo-panel analysis based on the 
different types of taxation and a panel analysis based on indirect taxation, show that 
the main reason for statutory tax changes is the existence of economic crises; this 
explanation is stronger than economic considerations like population or expenditure 
growth, legal considerations like the rigidity for changing statutory taxes, and income 
distribution considerations like the incidence on the bottom income decile.  
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1. Introduction  
As a reaction to the recent crises many O.E.C.D. countries raised tax rates as a way to 
cope with the high budget deficit. Figure 1 shows that the main reaction was through 
indirect taxation, represented by the Value Added Tax (V.A.T.).  
Note that this reaction is opposite to the normative prescription by economic 
models. It is generally agreed that during recessions fiscal policy should be 
countercyclical, i.e., statutory taxes should remain constant or be lowered and 
expenditure increased, with a higher tolerance for increasing the deficit.
2
 While 
almost all existing studies on cyclical policy check the reaction of expenditure and 
deficit, almost none of them include a test for taxes, due to lack of data on statutory 
tax rates.  
Lane (2002) shows that fiscal policy is countercyclical in OECD countries, 
based on total expenditure and on expenditure composition (transfers, government 
consumption and investment). Gavin and Perotti (1997) show that fiscal policy is 
procyclical in Latin American countries, based on total expenditure and on budget 
deficit. Also for Israel, Strawczynski and Zeira (2007) show an improvement on 
counter-cyclicality after 1985, based on these two variables.   
With respect to taxation, while in normative terms we would expect an a-
cyclical or countercyclical policy, we frequently see that in recessions, when 
governments are required to reduce their deficits, they tend to raise statutory taxes; 
i.e., a procyclical policy. Recent examples during the world crisis are Spain, Greece 
and Italy. Also in Israel taxes were raised in response to the crisis. This paper will 
investigate whether these casual observations conform a pattern, by checking the 
reaction of statutory tax rates to cycles in a systematic analysis, using Israel historical 
data. 
Two papers addressed so far the issue of cyclicality of statutory tax rates. 
Vegh and Vuletin (2011) performed tests on cyclicality of statutory tax rates at the 
sub-national level for both Argentina and the US. Their finding was puzzling: while 
tax rates in Argentina tend to be countercyclical, they found that in the US statutory 
tax rates tend to be procyclical. This result is opposite to what was found at the 
federal level for the expenditure side, at which developed economies are usually 
                                                 
2
 Constant tax rates as a reaction to the cycle has been emphasized by Barro (1979); a 
countercyclical policy is emphasized by Spilimbergo, Symanski, Blanchard and Cotarelli 
(2008).  
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countercyclical and emerging economies are procyclical. They also found that both in 
Argentina and US the higher is the influence of the federal budget on sub-national 
budget, the more procyclical statutory tax policy is, since at good times it becomes 
optimal to reduce statutory tax rates. This finding hints on a possible procyclicality in 
the reaction of statutory tax rates at the sub-national level, an issue that has not been 
studied yet at the federal level. Vegh and Vuletin (2012) checked cyclicality of 
statutory tax rates at the central government level, in a sample of both developed and 
developing countries. They found an acyclical tax policy in developed economies, and 
a procyclical policy in developing economies. Concerning the composition of taxes in 
developed economies, they found some evidence of a procyclical policy for indirect 
taxes. 
 
In this paper I work on a single country, Israel, allowing me to use a broader database 
including many different sources of taxation. For this purpose I build on a singular 
data base using data on statutory tax rates during the period 1960 to 2012, covering 87 
percent of tax revenues. The data covers both direct sources of taxation – income tax, 
corporate tax, social insurance taxes and capital taxes – and indirect taxes – V.A.T., 
car custom duties, housing purchase taxes and excise taxes.  
In Israel the concern for fiscal deficits during recessions has been repeatedly a 
driving force for raising statutory tax rates.  While reform of income tax rates requires 
discussion and approval by the parliament, indirect taxes, and in particular the V.A.T., 
can be amended by a decision taken by the Finance Minister. This characteristic 
makes this source more prone to be used as a quick reaction to the cycle. Thus, our 
prior hypothesis is that indirect taxation is a clear candidate for procyclicality. In 
order to check the plausibility of a political\ institutional explanation, I build an index 
that considers the complexity of the process of decision for changing the different 
statutory tax rates.  
A well-known concern for checking cyclicality of fiscal variables is the 
endogeneity of these variables since they have an effect on the GDP (see Ilzetsky and 
Vegh, 2008, for a thorough discussion of this topic).  We cope with this problem by 
using world trade growth as an instrumental variable for GDP growth, as shown in 
section 4. Another concern is related to causality: do statutory tax rates affect growth 
or the opposite? This issue is analyzed by using Granger causality tests. 
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The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 I describe the data. In section 3 
I present a framework for analyzing the cyclicality of statutory tax rates, and perform 
a time series analysis. In section 4 I proceed by showing pseudo-panel regressions in 
which the different tax channels are considered as cross-section units in the analysis. 
Finally I summarize and conclude in section 5.  The three appendices at the end show 
the details for building exogenous and endogenous statutory tax rates (Appendix A), 
Granger causality tests (Appendix B) and the long-run equations (Appendix C). 
  
2. The Data 
I collect data on nine sources of taxation, which cover 87 percent of tax revenues. The 
sources of direct taxation are: income tax, corporate tax, national insurance (payroll) 
tax, capital gains tax. The sources of indirect taxation are: V.A.T. (for consumers, 
non-profit organizations – NPO - and financial sector), gasoline excise tax, car tax, 
tobacco tax, housing purchase tax. I build an aggregate index based on all sources of 
taxation (STAT_TOTAL), and a direct (STAT_DIR) and indirect (STAT_IND) 
measure, composed by the taxes mentioned above. The weights are calculated 
according to the proportion of each tax on total revenues in the period 1980-2009. In 
table 1 I show the average weights for 2008/2009. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the developments of statutory tax rates over time. The 
shaded areas represent recession periods, using the dates according to previous 
research.
3
 Figure 2 refers to total taxation, and Figure 3 shows the behavior of specific 
channels of direct and indirect taxation. 
 
As a general pattern, indirect taxes are raised during recessions (shadowed areas) as a 
way to alleviate the budget deficit that arises in these periods, following the shortfall 
in tax revenues as a consequence of the decline in the GDP. Since some of these 
changes maybe exogenous (ideological) that happened to be implemented in a 
particular phase of the cycle, we shall first classify taxes between exogenous 
(ideological) and endogenous (cyclical), using the methodology introduced by Romer 
and Romer (2010). Then, I will check whether procyclicality is corroborated by the 
                                                 
3 Unlike the U.S. where the NBER characterizes business cycles, in Israel they have been 
characterized by different research papers. While there are some discrepancies among 
different papers,  recession periods are quite similar in all of them. The figures here are based 
on Flug and Strawczynski (2007). 
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econometric analysis – which controls for relevant additional variables that explain 
statutory tax rates. According to Romer and Romer (2010) methodology, I look at the 
legislative background of each one of the changes in statutory tax rates during Israeli 
history. After analyzing the environment of statutory tax rates decisions I aim at 
understanding whether they were exogenous – i.e., motivated by ideological reasons – 
which are independent of economic activity; or whether they were endogenous – i.e., 
reacted to the economic conditions. Appendix A summarizes the changes in taxation 
that obey to the exogenous criteria. Endogenous changes (symbolized by including 
the word ENDO at the name of the relevant variable) are all other changes in statutory 
tax rates performed during the sample period. The next stage is to use the cyclical 
observations to check whether the government increases (decreases) direct or indirect 
taxes during recessions – thus pursuing a procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. 
One possible claim against Romer and Romer (2010) methodology is that the timing 
of exogenous reforms may become endogenous. If this is the case, we shall see that 
exogenous changes are affected by the GDP. In appendix B I show that exogenous 
changes in taxes Granger-cause GDP and not the opposite, while changes in GDP 
Granger cause endogenous changes in indirect taxation and not the other way round.  
 
3. Statutory Changes and Cyclicality 
3.1 The Framework of the Analysis 
Assume that taxes finance government expenditure: 
(1) GYYtYT  )()(  
Where t is a statutory tax function, Y is the GDP and G symbolizes government 
expenditure. For simplicity let us assume that:  
(2) tYYt )(  
Where t is a (linear) statutory tax rate and θ is a parameter related to the convexity of 
the function, implying that the elasticity of the average statutory tax rate to GDP is 
higher than 1.
4
 After plugging back (2) into (1) it is easy to see that T'(Y) is positive, 
and T''(Y) is also positive. This means that the tax system is characterized by 
progressivity, i.e., the higher is Y the higher is the marginal aggregate average tax 
rate. This characterization is in line with most basic tax modeling. 
                                                 
4 The elasticity of taxes to GDP was estimated by Brender and Navon (2010). 
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Assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglass: 
(3)    1LAKY  
Where K symbolizes capital and L labor. 
Plugging (3) and (2) in equation (1), and taking logs derives in the following 
equation: 
(4)  )ln()1()ln(ln)ln()ln()ln( LKAYGt    
In order to test this equation I will run cointegration equations, and I will 
afterwards check cyclicality in the framework of the short run regression. 
Since the focus of my work is to check the cyclicality of statutory tax rates, the 
analysis will be performed at two dimensions: first, I check the relationship between 
statutory tax rates and the cycle as measured by changes in the GDP; and second, I 
use Romer and Romer (2010) methodology which, as explained above, separates 
between exogenous and endogenous statutory tax changes. This classification allows 
me to test whether the endogenous statutory tax changes are correlated with the cycle 
– and in particular, whether these reactions are counter or procyclical. In Appendix B 
I show Granger causality tests, which reinforce the conclusion that causality goes 
from the cycle to endogenous indirect taxes.
5
 
It is important to stress that this research concentrates in statutory tax rates, as 
opposed to effective tax rates. Statutory tax rates include only the official rates, 
ignoring deductions or exemptions, which also affect tax collection. Ideally it would 
be desirable to take all taxation changes into account – since some of these 
exemptions or deductions may have a cyclical pattern as well. However, due to lack 
of data I concentrate in this research on statutory tax rates only. It is worth stressing 
that the changes in statutory tax rates in Israel are significantly more frequent and 
quantitatively significant than changes in provisions related to deductions or 
exemptions. 
 
 3.2 Cyclicality of Direct and Indirect Statutory Tax Rates 
According to the cointegration technique the first stage is to run a long-run equation 
of the model, which is given in equation 4, augmented to additional variables that are 
                                                 
5  In order to check the consistency of the data, I also test whether exogenous taxes affect 
GDP. Note, however, that a full analysis of this topic merits a separate paper. 
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candidates for contributing to cointegration. Since the short run equation requires lags 
in order check possible lagged cyclical reaction, we include a symmetric structure in 
the long run equation, and then compute the residuals which will be used in the short 
run equations. As required by cointegration, all variables are I(1) using the ADF 
criterium. Note that the specification requires considering separately the total factor 
productivity (A), which is correlated to the GDP. Since I do not aim on estimating a 
structural version of the production function, I run a regression using measurable 
variables and I only use a cointegration interpretation.
6
 Note also that since the main 
specification includes real government expenditure, the sample starts in 1988 – since 
quarterly data for this variable is available only since that year. 
The main long-run equations are presented in Appendix C, and they 
corroborate cointegration at a  5 percent level of significance, using McKinnon (1991) 
critical variables.  
Table C.1 checks the basic framework, using capital, labor and productivity 
together with government expenditure. The regression shows cointegration at 10 
percent, with standard production function coefficients (two-thirds for labor and one-
third for capital). Note also that the coefficient of total productivity is negative as 
expected. The next two regressions add additional variables which show that 
coefficients have the expected sign and cointegration is obtained at 10 percent.  
Using this information I turn back to equation (4) and try to build 
cointegration regressions that include cyclical variables. From now on the single 
purpose is obtaining a significant cointegration relationship. The lagged residual of 
this regression will be used at the short run regression so as to check the reaction of 
statutory tax rates to GDP in the short run – which is the main question asked at this 
research.  
Results on cointegration are shown in Table C.2. The use of cyclical variables 
contributes significantly to the regressions, especially for endogenous indirect taxes, 
in which cointegration is obtained at a high level of significance. While in the 
specification for direct taxes cointegration is not obtained at 10 percent, I will be able 
to cross-check the long-run relationship by looking at the significance of the lagged 
                                                 
6 Estimating the effect of taxes on a consistent framework that respects a production function 
is beyond the present research. For a paper that studied these effects see Lavi and 
Strawczynski (2002). 
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error term at the short run regressions, which according to the Engle-Granger 
hypothesis shall be significant if a cointegration relationship exists.  
The short-run analysis is presented in Table 2. Error terms are significant at 5 
and 1 percent, corroborating the existence of cointegration. Concerning cyclicality, 
note that the coefficient for endogenous direct taxes is not significant; i.e., direct taxes 
are a-cyclical. The cycle coefficients are significant for indirect taxes – both for total 
indirect taxes (at 5 percent) and in particular for endogenous indirect statutory tax 
rates (at 1 percent). The sign of the coefficient is negative, which means that indirect 
tax rates are lowered during expansions and raised during recessions – i.e., a 
procyclical policy.  
I shall mention that the tax burden of indirect taxes is higher for poor families, 
since a high percentage of income is spent on consumption. Given    this fact, 
procyclicality implies an increase in the burden on the poor at the most difficult 
periods. Assuming an inequality averse social utility function, this result raises serious 
questions on the desirability of this policy, which may be dominated by short run 
political considerations (this feature is further investigated in the next section). In 
particular, it raises a question on whether there should be political restrictions on 
changing tax rates during recessions, contrary to what happens in reality: indirect 
taxes in Israel can be changed by a decision of the Minister of Finance requiring only 
the advice (with no further restrictions) of the Economics Committee at the 
parliament. A measure of the legal flexibility for changing statutory taxes is shown in 
the next section.  
 
3.3. Cyclicality of Specific Taxes: V.A.T. and Gasoline 
To complete the picture I tested the cyclical behavior of the specific categories of 
indirect taxes. In this section I present results about V.A.T. and gasoline. As before, I 
start with the long run analysis. 
Cointegration regressions are shown in appendix table C3; in the endogenous 
sources of taxation there is a cointegration relationship, as corroborated by the 
significant ADF statistic (at 5 and 1 percent). 
The regressions on cyclicality are presented in Table 3. Note that in all 
regressions the error correction term is significant, corroborating the cointegration 
relationship. The most interesting result is related to procyclicallity: both the V.A.T. 
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and the gasoline statutory taxes are showing a procyclical behavior, especially when 
we look at the endogenous statutory tax rates. 
 
4. Adjustment of Statutory Taxes: a Pseudo-Panel Analysis 
In this section I perform a pseudo-panel analysis in which the dependent variables are 
the average indices of taxation, and the independent variables are formed by the 
characteristics of the 11 categories of taxation as shown in Table 1; the sample period 
is based on 52 quarters in the period I.1997 until IV.2009.
7
 I learned in the previous 
section that endogenous direct taxes are not sensible to the cycle; as a consequence of 
that, running standard panel regressions with all tax sources as a dependent variable 
derives in a low explaining power.
8
 In order to learn more about statutory tax 
behavior I use a pseudo-panel approach, in which the value added comes from the 
specific characteristics of the tax sources; these characteristics are not tested in a time 
series analysis because of the need of considering variation among the different types 
of taxes. These characteristics include the elasticity of the tax base, the number of 
households that pay the tax, income distribution characteristics, and additional 
variables as described below. I collected the following data on new variables that are 
candidates for explaining the adjustment of tax rates: 
- Macroeconomic Variables – tax rates are usually increased in difficult times; 
in order to pick this phenomenon I use a macroeconomic index (see Flug and 
Strawczynski, 2007) that incorporates inflation, government deficits, black 
market premium and exchange rate dissalignement and variability.
9
 This index 
is used in order to build a dummy variable called 'crisis', which takes the value 
of 1 in years in which the macroeconomic index is below a threshold. Two 
definitions of the variable 'crisis' will be used: a) for years in which the 
macroeconomic index falls for more than two consecutive quarters until it 
comes back to its previous level (CRISIS); b) for years in which the 
                                                 
7 In this analysis I use data from the expenditure survey, which is regularly available only in 
this period. In appendix D I extend the analysis to the period 1960q1-2011q4. 
8 In fact, in the regular panel regressions I got a low R squared and the coefficients of 
dlog(gdp) were not significant. For a further explanation of this point see appendix D. 
9 The formula shown in that paper (using a principal component approach)  is: macro_index= 
0.334*budget surplus-0.447*inflation-0.585*black market premium-0.347*overvaluation-
0.475*exchange rate variability.  
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macroeconomic index falls for more than two consecutive quarters (CRISIS2) 
until it changes direction. Figure 4 shows the direct and indirect statutory 
average tax rate at different recession periods in Israeli economic history; 
these periods are all included in the variable CRISIS and CRISIS2. In five 
periods (73-76, 77-79, 80-82, 87-90, 2001-04 and 2008-10) there is a clear 
change in policy characterized by a substantial rise in indirect statutory tax 
rates as a way to cope with the budget deficit created during the recession. 
Note that for this type of tax the maximum tax rate is higher than the one at 
the beginning of the period. This is particularly notable at the beginning of the 
seventies and at the recent crisis. Additional macroeconomic variables are  the 
level of debt and the forecasted growth at the budget (not reported in the 
regressions because it was not significant). 
- Economic variables – I use estimates of elasticities of the different taxes 
(ELAST). According to economic theory (Ramsey optimal taxation) we shall 
expect that taxes are inversely related to the elasticity. Thus, the question is 
whether governments that are forced to change tax rates put some weight on 
efficiency issues. I use elasticities for income tax (Gruber and Saez, 2000), for 
corporate tax (Wolswijk, 2007), for V.A.T. (Wolswijk, 2007), for cars 
(Jorgensen and Dargay, 2006), for housing (Hanushek and Quigley, 1980), for 
gasoline (Hughes, Mintel and Sperling, 2008) and for cigarettes (Gruber, Sen 
and Stabile, 2002).   
- Political variables – The variable ELECT picks four quarters before election; 
the standard argument used in the political economy literature of a populist 
policy would imply reducing tax rates in election periods – i.e., a negative 
coefficient. GOV_TIME is the de-facto term of the governments, which is 
supposed to be four years but in practice it lasts frequently for a shorter period. 
It is difficult to analyze the sign of its coefficient ex-ante: in one hand a short 
period may mean a weak government which may do a populist policy, but on 
the other hand a sudden stop of the government may impede such a policy. 
- Legal Variables (LEGAL) – I build an index that considers the simplicity of 
changing statutory tax rates. According to the law in Israel, changing the 
V.A.T. requires advice from the Economic Committee at the parliament, while 
changing the income tax requires approval of the parliament – implying a long 
process. Clearly I shall expect that a shorter process implies ex-ante that 
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politicians are more prone to change this type of tax. After analyzing the 
details included in the laws, I have chosen two categories: the V.A.T., gasoline 
and tobacco tax rates take a value of 2, while the income tax, car taxes and the 
rest of taxes mentioned in table 1 take the value of 1. In times of crisis I expect 
a positive coefficient for the interaction between CRISIS and LEGAL: the 
easier is for politicians changing the statutory tax rate, the more frequent it is 
expected to be adjusted in crisis periods. 
- Taxation Revenue Considerations – Note that when the government adjusts a 
tax rate the burden is concentrated on the households that form part of the tax 
base. An interesting question is whether the government takes into account 
this kind of considerations when adjusting the statutory taxes. In order to 
check this issue I include as an explaining variable the number of households 
(HOUSE_NUM) affected by the tax rate. 
- Income Distribution Variables – the variable TOP10 represents the percent of 
the highest decile (the highest ten percent income earners) on the tax base by 
using data from the expenditure survey of the Central Bureau of Statistics of 
Israel.  Thus, f.e., for V.A.T. it represents their share in consumption; for the 
income tax their share on wages; and for the gasoline tax their share on 
gasoline consumption. The variable BOTTOM40 represents the share of the 
lowest 40 percent income earners on the tax base. 
Finally, I add the economic cycle as an additional explaining variable and 
interaction terms with CRISIS.  
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 show the results of the pseudo-panel analysis. These results are 
comparable to results shown in the literature on cyclicality of fiscal policy, since 
similarly to those papers I cope in this table with the endogeneity issue. For this 
purpose I take changes in the world trade (with one and two lags) as an instrumental 
variable for changes in GDP. Before starting the analysis, I performed a test for the 
validity of the instrumental variable, as suggested by Yitzhaki and Schechtman 
(2004), and it turned out that it passed the test.
10
 
                                                 
10 These authors show that in order to use the instrumental variable the concentration curves 
of  the original and instrumental variables shall not cross each other, as turned out to be  the 
case with dlog(gdp) and dlog(wt). This result implies that the use of the instrumental variable 
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Note that in all tables the lagged residuals are significant which means that the 
panel regressions satisfy the long-run relationship, and the DW statistic is at a level 
that allows rejecting autocorrelation.  
Table 4 is the first step for extending the time series analysis of the previous 
section. From this table I learn that the variable CRISIS is significant for indirect 
taxes in general, and for total endogenous taxes. Other variables that are significant 
for total statutory taxes are ELECT and GOV_TIME, both with a negative sign. These 
results mean that in election periods and in governments that last for long periods, 
there is a trend to reduce taxes. A remarkable result is that among endogenous taxes, 
the single source that is significant at 1 percent is endogenous indirect taxation. Thus, 
this analysis confirms the result I obtained in the previous section – according to 
which indirect endogenous taxes are raised in difficult periods and reduced in good 
ones. 
In the next tables I use the world trade as an instrument for GDP. In table 5 I 
perform different kinds of sensitivity analysis for analyzing the result on indirect 
endogenous taxation, which is the dependent variable in all the regressions that appear 
in this table. In the first regression I omit the variable d(macro), to avoid a possible 
correlation with the variable crisis. The result of procyclicality of endogenous indirect 
taxes remains significant. In column 2 I analyze procyclicality only in crisis periods, 
by looking at the interaction between changes in GDP and CRISIS. Interestingly, the 
coefficient is higher than in the first regression, which means that in periods of crisis 
there is a remarkable procyclicality. In the third regression I check whether the 
reaction is with a lag, and found that procyclicality is related to a lagged response to 
GDP. Finally, I check sensitivity to the second definition of crisis: as explained above 
CRISIS2 takes the value of 1 when the macro index falls for at least two consecutive 
quarters, and 0 otherwise. Thus, this definition is sharper in the sense that a crisis is 
related to a deterioration of macroeconomic management and not to its level. The 
result shows that the coincident coefficient of GDP is -0.66, and in periods of crisis it 
rises (in the same quarter) by an additional -0.52 (with 10 percent significance). 
In table 6 I check whether the changes in total endogenous taxes in periods of 
crisis are related to other characteristics of the different taxation channels. Regression 
                                                                                                                                            
(or a transformation) is clean from possible "manipulations" on the sign of the independent 
variable.  
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1 checks whether endogenous taxes  are affected by the legal difficulty of changing 
taxes. The positive and significant result (at 10 percent) means that in times of crisis 
government tends to raise taxes that are easier to change; note that the coefficient is 
comparable to the one of regression 4 of table 4 (0.003): two thirds of the changes 
made in periods of crisis are done through channels that are easier to change from a 
legal point of view. In the next two regressions I obtained that during crisis taxes are 
raised for items that are elastic and with a high number of households – which allow 
collecting more revenues. In the last two regressions I obtained that the revenues 
collected in crisis affect in a similar way the bottom 40 percent and the top 10 percent 
of the income distribution – i.e., changes made in times of crisis are not progressive.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the cyclicality of statutory tax rates in Israel, using data that 
covers 87 percent of tax revenues. I found that while direct taxes are a-cyclical, 
indirect taxes (and in particular VAT) are changed procyclically. A pseudo-panel 
analysis based on the different types of taxation shows that the main reason for 
statutory tax changes is the existence of economic crises, as opposed to economic 
considerations like population or expenditure growth, legal considerations like the 
rigidity for changing statutory taxes, and income distribution considerations like the 
incidence on the bottom income decile. A panel analysis for indirect sources of 
taxation confirms the significance of economic crises and the economic cycle as 
explanatory variables for adjusting indirect taxes. 
A direction for further research is to check whether the pattern that I found for 
Israel concerning direct and indirect sources of taxation occurs also in a cross-section 
sample of countries, differentiating between developed and developing economies.  
For this purpose there is a need of collecting statutory tax rates over time. A first 
attempt on this direction, using annual data, was recently performed by Vegh and 
Vulletin (2012). 
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APPENDIX A – Romer and Romer Methodology 
Following Romer and Romer (2010) approach, I classified the statutory tax changes 
into two categories: exogenous and endogenous. In order to perform this task, I 
analyzed the Tax Revenues Report of the Ministry of Finance and the newspapers at 
the time of the decision, and I looked at the explanations given by policy makers. If 
the change was presented as a reform or a structural change, and it was previously 
announced (as opposed to a decision taken close to the implemented change), the 
statutory change was considered as exogenous; otherwise, it is considered as 
endogenous. 
 
Table A.1: Main Exogenous Tax changes in Israel 
 
The following charts show the endogenous and exogenous statutory changes in Israel. 
While endogenous taxes were changed in both directions, exogenous taxes were 
mainly reduced. From the chart it is evident that the reduction of income taxes since 
2004 was exogenous. Another characteristic is that endogenous taxes were raised in 
the recessions (see 2001-2003 and 2009-2010). 
Statutory Change Year 
Reduction of income taxes to low income individuals 4691 
Imposition of housing purchase tax (before there existed similar 
taxes) 
4691 
Imposition of the V.A.T. 4699 
Abolition of the wealth tax on housing, firms buildings, and 
agricultural property 
4694 
Reduction of income and corporate taxes 4699-4699 
Reduction of corporate tax 4661-4661 
Reduction of car taxes 4664-4661 
Reduction of income and corporate taxes, addition of a reduced tax 
rate for low incomes in the National Insurance contributions. 
4661-4669 
Abolition of the wealth tax 0111 
Imposition of the capital gains tax 0111 
Reduction in income and corporate taxes 0111  onwards 
V.A.T. reduction 0111-0119 
Reduction of car taxes 0119-0116 
Green tax reform (rise in car taxation) 0116 
  
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
17 
Appendix B 
I do not aim at testing the impact of exogenous taxes on GDP, which requires a 
separate research. However, I perform Granger Causality tests so as to analyze the 
classification of endogenous and exogenous taxes. I expect exogenous taxes to 
Granger-cause the GDP, and that the GDP Granger-causes endogenous taxes. 
 
Granger Causality Tests (two lags) 
 
Result F-statistic Period Null hypothesis 
Exogenous Statutory Taxes and GDP 
We can not 
reject the null 
hypothesis  
2.2 1960q1 - 2011q4 
Statutory_Tax_FULL does not Granger 
Cause log(GDP_SA) 
We can not 
reject the null 
hypothesis  
0.9 1960q1 - 2011q4 
  log(GDP_SA) does not Granger Cause 
Statutory_Tax_FULL 
We can reject 
the null 
hypothesis  
3.2* 1960q1 - 2011q4 
Statutory_tax_EXOG does not Granger 
Cause  log(GDP_SA) 
We can not 
reject the null 
hypothesis  
0.9 1960q1 - 2011q4 
  log(GDP_SA) does not Granger Cause 
Statutory_tax_EXOG 
Endogenous Statutory Taxes and GDP 
We can not 
reject the null 
hypothesis  
0.9 1960q1 - 2011q4 
dlog(Statutory_Tax_ENDO) does not 
Granger Cause dlog(GDP_SA) 
We can not 
reject the null 
hypothesis  
0.3 1960q1 - 2011q4 
dlog(GDP_SA) does not Granger Cause 
dlog(Statutory_Tax_ENDO)  
We can not 
reject the null 
hypothesis  
0.0 1960q1 - 2011q4 
dlog(Statutory_Tax_ENDO_INDIRECT) 
does not Granger Cause dlog(GDP_SA) 
We can reject 
the null 
hypothesis  
3.0 1960q1 - 2011q4 
dlog(GDP_SA) does not Granger Cause 
dlog(Statutory_Tax_ENDO_INDIRECT) 
We can not 
reject the null 
hypothesis  
0.9 1960q1 - 2011q4 
dlog(Statutory_Tax_ENDO_DIRECT) 
does not Granger Cause dlog(GDP_SA) 
We can not 
reject the null 
hypothesis  
0.1 1960q1 - 2011q4 
dlog(GDP_SA) does not Granger Cause 
dlog(Statutory_Tax_ENDO_DIRECT) 
Results show GDP causes mainly endogenous indirect taxation. 
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Appendix C – Long Run Equations 
Table C.1: Basic Framework 
log(stat_ 
total) 
log(stat_ 
total) 
log(stat_ 
total) 
Period: 
 1987q2-2011q4 
(3) (2) (1)   
6.4 3.1 6.0 
C 
(0.6)*** (0.3)*** (0.4)*** 
0.1  0.8 log(HP_ 
Government spending) (0.2)  (0.2)*** 
-0.1  -0.7 
log (population) 
(0.3)  (0.2)*** 
-0.1  -0.3 
log (capital stock) 
(0.1)*  (0.1)*** 
-1.3  -1.2 
log (Productivity) 
(0.1)***  (0.1)*** 
 1.9  
 HP_Gov. Sp. / GDP      
 (0.2)**   
0.9 0.5  Immigrants 
(0.3)*** (0.3)*   
-0.1 0.2  Log(Debt) 
(0.06)** (0.04)***   
 0.9  Gini 
 (0.3)***   
 -0.04  Log (FW) 
 (0.02)**   
0.02 0.02  Trade_Partners_Income 
(0.006)*** (0.005)***   
 -0.01  Gov_Time 
 (0.001)***   
0.91 0.91 0.89 AdjR² 
0.9 0.9 0.6 D.W. 
-5.2** -4.8* -4.1* ADF 
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Table C.2: Cyclicality of Statutory Tax Rates: Long Run Equation 
 
1988q4 - 2011q4 Period 
Dependent Variable   
log(stat_ 
endo_ind) 
log(stat_ 
endo_dir) 
log(stat_ 
endo_total) 
log(stat_ 
ind) 
log(stat_ 
dir) 
log(stat_ 
total) 
 
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)   
2.6 5.1 4.5 3.6 9.8 7.4 
C (0.9)*** 
 
(0.4)*** 
 
(0.3)*** 
 
(0.8)*** 
 
(0.7)*** 
 
(0.5)*** 
 
-1.1 -0.2 -0.5 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 log(HP_ 
Government 
spending) 
 
(0.2)*** 
 
 
(0.2) 
 
 
(0.1)*** 
 
 
(0.3)*** 
 
 
(0.3)*** 
 
 
(0.2)*** 
 
 
4.1 -0.1 0.9 3.1 -1.2 0.5 log 
(population) 
 
(0.6)*** 
 
(0.2) 
 
(0.1)*** 
 
(0.4)*** 
 
(0.3)*** 
 
(0.2)** 
 
-0.1 0.2 0.06 -0.2 1.0 0.5 log (capital 
stock) 
 
(0.1) 
 
(0.05)*** 
 
(0.04)* 
 
(0.1)* 
 
(0.1)*** 
 
(0.1)*** 
 
-1.5 -0.02 -0.3 -0.9 -0.3 -0.6 
log (GDP) (0.3)*** 
 
(0.1) 
 
(0.1)*** 
 
(0.2)*** 
 
(0.2)** 
 
(0.1)*** 
 
-0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.09 -0.1 
log (Debt) (0.08)** 
 
(0.03)** 
 
(0.03)*** 
 
(-0.07)* 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.04)** 
 
-0.04 -0.01 0.003 -0.04 0.008 0.02 log 
(Immigration) 
 
(0.007)*** 
 
(0.003)*** 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.006)*** 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004)*** 
 
-0.5 -0.3 -0.005 0.7 3.8 2.5 Gini 
(0.6) 
 
(0.2) 
 
(0.2) 
 
(0.5) 
 
(0.4)*** 
 
(0.3)*** 
  
0.03 
(0.006)*** 
 
0.005 
(0.003) 
 
0.008 
(0.002)*** 
 
0.03 
(0.006)*** 
 
0.02 
(0.005)*** 
 
0.03 
(0.004)*** 
 
Trade Partners 
Inc. 
 
0.84 0.83 0.40 0.86 0.96 0.96 AdjR² 
1.7 0.8 1.1 1.6 0.8 1.1 D.W. 
-8.2*** -4.6 -6.1*** -7.6*** -4.7 -5.9*** ADF 
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Table C.3: Specific Indirect Taxes: Long Run Equation 
 
1988q1 - 2011q4 Period 
Dependent Variable 
log(gasoline_endo) log(vat_endo) log(gasoline) log(vat) 
 
(4) (3) (2) (1)   
7.7 1.8 6.6 0.5 
C 
(2.4)*** (0.6)*** (2.4)*** (0.8) 
1.6 -0.9 0.7 -0.6 log(HP_Government 
Spending) (0.9)* (0.3)*** (0.9) (0.3)* 
5.6 2.9 6.2 2.2 
log (population) 
(1.3)*** (0.3)*** (1.3)*** (0.4)*** 
0.3 -0.1 0.5 0.002 
log (capital stock) 
(0.3) (0.08)* (0.3) (0.1) 
-5.7 -0.8 -5.5 -0.9 
log (GDP) 
(0.7)*** (0.1)*** (0.7)*** (0.2)*** 
-1.8 -0.2 -1.8 -0.2 
log (Debt) 
(0.2)*** (0.05)*** (0.2) (0.1)** 
0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 
log (Immigrants) 
(0.02)*** (0.005)*** (0.02)*** (0.006)*** 
-3.7 -0.06 -3.4 1.5 Gini 
(1.6)** (0.4) (1.6)** (0.5)***  
0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02  
(0.02)* (0.005)*** (0.02)* (0.006)***  
0.76 0.78 0.73 0.71 AdjR² 
1.4 0.9 1.4 0.8 D.W. 
-7.1*** -5.2** -7.0*** -4.6 ADF 
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Table C4: Pseudo-Panel Analysis: Long Run Equation 
(Standard Deviation in Parenthesis) 
 
1997q1 - 2009q3 Period 
Dependent Variable   
log(stat_ 
endo_ind) 
log(stat_ 
endo_dir) 
log(stat_ 
endo_total) 
log(stat_ind) 
log(stat_ 
dir) 
log(stat_total) 
 
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)   
9.843 4.591 5.128 5.322 5.783 5.529 
C 
(0.2)*** (0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.2)*** (0.4)*** (0.3)*** 
0.006 0.004 0.008 0.020 0.018 0.019 
Crisis 
(0.0) (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** 
0.653 -0.090 0.011 0.400 0.533 0.500 
log(debt) 
(0.1)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)* (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** 
0.015 0.004 -0.012 -0.134 -0.313 -0.240 
log(G) 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)** 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.017 0.010 
Elast 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.013 -0.009 log(house_ 
num) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)* (0.0)* 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Legal 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
0.048 -0.013 -0.006 -0.005 0.016 0.008 
macro_index 
(0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0) (0.0)*** (0.0)* 
0.030 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Elect 
(0.0)*** (0.0) (0.0)*** (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
-0.029 -0.008 -0.010 -0.013 0.170 0.101 
top10 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1)* (0.1) 
-0.026 -0.007 -0.009 -0.013 0.145 0.083 
bottom40 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1)* (0.0) 
0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.016 -0.012 
gov_time 
(0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** 
-0.401 0.054 -0.004 
   log(GDP) 
(0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0) 
   
0.84 0.91 0.45 0.84 0.88 0.90 AdjR² 
1.1 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.9 D.W. 
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APPENDIX D – Panel Analysis of Indirect Endogenous Tax Rates 
 
I have shown that endogenous direct and indirect tax rates behave differently against 
the cycle. Thus, running unconstrained panel analysis results in insignificant behavior 
against the cycle and in a low R squared.  
Thus, in this appendix I build a panel analysis that is based only on 
endogenous indirect tax rates; i.e., the dependent variable is formed by the seven 
categories of indirect taxation as shown in Table 1. Note that in a panel analysis 
taxation sources are not independent, and thus a correction for the cointegration 
framework is needed, along the lines of Pesaran (2006). In order to enrich the 
historical analysis I choose all possible independent variables that go back to 1961q1.  
I then run a long run panel equation, first assuming that taxes are independent 
(see equation 1), and then correcting for dependence using the methodology suggested 
by Pesaran (2006) – see equation 2. This correction requires adding the average 
values of the dependent variable and independent variables, as explained by Eberhardt 
and Bond (2009). 
After obtaining the long run relationships I run short run equations that include 
the change in the same variables, including 2 lags, and the residual with one lag. 
Table D.1 shows the long-run regressions with the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) 
W statistic, which turned to be significant at 1 percent. 
Table D.2 shows the short run regressions. The lagged residual is significant. 
Note also that the crisis dummy is significant at 1 percent, and that the coefficient that 
testifies about procyclical policy continues to be significant in this analysis. 
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Table D.1: Panel Analysis for Endogenous Indirect Taxes –  
Long Run Equation 
 
1961q2 - 2011q4          1827 Observations Period 
Dependent Variable 
log(endo-
genous 
indirect) 
log(endo-
genous 
indirect) 
log(endo-
genous 
indirect) 
log(endo-
genous 
indirect) 
 
(4) (3) (2) (1)   
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
C 
(0.04)*** (0.2)*** (0.04)*** (0.2)*** 
  0.0 -0.1 
Crisis 
  (0.0) (0.004)*** 
0.004 -0.04   Crisis2 
(0.001)*** (0.004)***    
-0.03 -0.1 -0.03 0.08 
log (Debt) 
(0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)*** 
-0.03 -0.005 -0.03 0.002 
Macro Index 
(0.004)*** (0.002)* (0.004)*** (0.002) 
-0.02 0.3 -0.03 0.3 
log (GDP) 
(0.004)*** (0.03)*** (0.008)*** (0.03)*** 
-0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 
log (world Trade) 
(0.004)*** (0.02)** (0.004)*** (0.02)* 
0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
Trade Partners Income 
(0.03)*** (0.003)*** (0.03)*** (0.003)*** 
--0.03 0.02 --0.03 0.007 War 
(0.003)*** (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.008)  
0.6  0.5  Average Independent 
(0.002)***  (0.002)***   
0.4  0.4  Average Dependent 
(0.06)***  (0.06)***   
0.99 0.85 0.99 0.85 AdjR² 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 D.W. 
-5.5*** -3.8*** -5.1*** -3.8*** W Statistic (IPS) 
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(1)  All the regressions includes one and two lags of dlog(gdp), dlog(world trade) 
and d(trade partners income).
Table D.2: Panel Analysis for Endogenous Indirect Taxes –  
Short Run Equation (1) 
 
1962q1 - 2011q4          1800 Observations Period 
Dependent Variable 
dlog(en-
dogenous 
indirect) 
dlog(en-
dogenous 
indirect) 
dlog(endo-
genous 
indirect) 
dlog(en-
dogenous 
indirect) 
 
(4) (3) (2) (1)   
0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002 
C 
(0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.001) (0.001) 
  0.01 0.01 
Crisis 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
0.003 0.003   Crisis2 
(0.0016)* (0.0016)**    
0.002 -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 
dlog (Debt) 
(0.03) (0.003)** (0.03) (0.03)*** 
-0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 
d(Macro Index) 
(0.003)*** (0.003)* (0.003)** (0.003)* 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 
dlog (GDP) 
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)** (0.03)** 
-0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 
dlog (world Trade) 
(0.03)** (0.03)** (0.03)* (0.03)* 
0.0005 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0004 
d(Trade Partners Income) 
(0.001) (0.0009) (0.0) (0.0) 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 War 
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***  
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 War(-1) 
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***  
-0.2 -0.03 -0.1 -0.02 Residual(-1) 
(0.05)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)***  
0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 AdjR² 
1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 D.W. 
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Figure 1: Number of OECD Countries That Changed Statutory Tax Rates 
During the Crisis  (between 2008 and 2012) 
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Figure 2: Average Statutory Tax Rate and Business Cycles  
(Shadowed Areas Represent Recessions) 
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Figure 3: Specific Statutory Tax Rates and Business Cycles 
(Shadowed Areas Represent Recessions) 
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Figure 4: The Reaction of Statutory Taxes During Recessions 
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Table 1: The Weights of the Different Taxes 
 
 
Weight  
(%) 
Tax Revenues  
(% of GDP) 
 
95.95 59.59 Total Direct Taxes 
28.35 6.11 Income tax 
12.98 3.25 Corporate tax 
17.18 5.4 National Insurance 
1.27 1.3 Capital gains 
92.05 50.91 Total Indirect Taxes 
25.66 8.11 V.A.T. for consumers 
2.89 1.98 V.A.T. for Non Profit Organizations 
1.87 1.28 V.A.T. for financial institutions 
4.85 2.14 Gasoline Tax 
3.59 1.96 Car Tax 
1.65 1.1 Tobacco Tax 
1.71 1.4 Housing Taxes 
522 09.95 Total 
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Table 2: Cyclicality of Statutory Tax Rates 
 
1988q1 - 2011q4 Period 
Dependent Variable   
dlog 
(stat_ 
endo_ 
ind)) 
   Dlog 
(  (stat_ 
endo_ 
dir) 
dlog 
(stat_ 
endo_total) 
dlog(stat_ 
ind)) 
dlog(stat_ 
dir)) 
dlog 
(stat_ 
total) 
 
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)   
-0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.01 -0.0 -0.0 
C (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.01) (0.0) (0.0) 
-1.2 -0.6 -0.8 -0.2 -0.7 -0.7 dlog 
(HP_Gov.Sp.) (1.5) (0.6) (0.5) (1.5) (1.0) (0.8) 
4.0 -0.4 1.0 4.3 -0.9 1.0 
dlog (population) (1.4)*** (0.5) (0.5)** (1.4)*** (0.9) (0.8) 
-0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.8 0.5 
dlog (capital stock) (0.6) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) (0.4)** (0.3) 
-0.7 -0.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.04 -0.2 
dlog (GDP)) (0.2)*** (0.0) (0.07)* (0.2)** (0.1) (0.1)* 
0.0 -0.0 -0.00 0.004 0.0005 0.002 
d (Debt) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.02 -0.0 0.0 0.02 0.005 0.01 
dlog (Immigr.) (0.008)** (0.0)* (0.0) (0.008)* (0.006) (0.004) 
0.7 0.8 0.8 -0.04 2.1 1.4 d(Gini) 
(1.9) (0.7) (0.6) (1.8) (1.2)* (1.0)  
0.01 0.002 0.006 0.02 0.01 0.01 
d(Trade_Par-
tners_Income) 
(0.006)*** (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.01)*** (0.004)* (0.003)***  
-0.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -0.4 
Residuals (-1)  (0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.1)*** 
0.23 0.16 0.28 0.37 0.15 0.26 AdjR² 
2.2 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.9 D.W. 
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Table 3: Cyclicality of Specific Indirect Taxes 
 
1988q1 - 2011q4 Period 
Dependent Variable 
dlog(gasoline_endog)) dlog(vat_endog)) dlog(gasoline)) dlog(vat)) 
 
(4) (3) (2) (1) 
  
-0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 
C 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
0.0 1.1 -0.9 -0.3 
dlog(HP_Gov. Sp.) 
(2.8) (2.6) (0.9) (1.0) 
2.3 3.4 3.3 2.9 
dlog (population) 
(2.7) (2.6) (0.9)*** (1.0)*** 
0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.03 
dlog (capital stock) 
(1.2) (1.1) (0.4) (0.4) 
-0.8 -1.0 -0.4 -0.3 
dlog (GDP)) 
(0.5)* (0.5)** (0.1)*** (0.1)** 
-0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 
d (Debt) 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
-0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
dlog (Immigrants) 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
4.8 0.0 -0.2 0.4 d(Gini) 
(3.4) (0.0) (1.1) (1.2)  
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
d(Trade Partners 
Income) 
-0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 
Residuals (-1)  
(0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.1)*** 
0.18 0.16 0.32 0.25 AdjR² 
1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 D.W. 
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Table 4: Cyclicality of Statutory Tax Rates: Panel Analysis (1) 
(Standard Deviation in Parenthesis) 
 
1997q3 - 2009q3 Period 
Dependent Variable   
dlog(stat_
endo_ind) 
dlog(stat_
endo_dir) 
dlog(stat_ 
endo_total) 
dlog(stat_ 
ind) 
dlog(stat_ 
dir) 
dlog(stat_ 
total) 
 
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)   
0.007 -0.001 0.001 0.008 0.021 0.017 
C 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
0.005 0.002 0.003 0.008 -0.007 0.000 
Crisis 
(0.0)* (0.0)* (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)** (0.0) 
0.024 -0.079 -0.065 0.023 0.241 0.142 
dlog(debt) 
(0.0) (0.0)*** (0.0)** (0.1) (0.1)** (0.1)* 
-0.080 -0.019 -0.031 -0.116 -0.004 -0.049 
dlog(G) 
(0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0) (0.0)*** 
-0.038 0.018 0.013 0.023 -0.022 -0.015 dlog(house_ 
num) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
0.000 -0.008 -0.007 0.060 0.030 0.022 d(macro_ 
index) (0.0) (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0) (0.0)*** (0.0)*** 
0.011 0.001 0.003 -0.007 -0.010 -0.009 
Elect 
(0.0)*** (0.0) (0.0)** (0.0)* (0.0)** (0.0)*** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
gov_time 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)*** (0.0)*** 
-0.295 -0.098 -0.327 -0.388 -0.149 -0.199 Residuals  
(-1)  (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.1)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** 
-0.265 0.029 -0.035 -0.205 -0.245 -0.243 
dlog(GDP) 
(0.1)*** (0.0) (0.0) (0.1)* (0.1)** (0.1)*** 
0.25 0.24 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.17 AdjR² 
2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.1 1.8 D.W. 
(1) The regression includes the variables ELAST, LEGAL, TOP10 and BOTTOM40, which were not 
significant and are not reported for space considerations. 
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Table 5: Endogenous Indirect Taxes During Crisis (1) 
 (Standard Deviation in Parenthesis) 
 
1997q2 - 2009q3 Period 
Dependent Variable   
d(log(stat_ 
endo_ind)) 
d(log(stat_ 
endo_ind)) 
d(log(stat_ 
endo_ind)) 
d(log(stat_ 
endo_ind)) 
 
(4) (3) (2) (1)   
0.006 -0.018 -0.003 0.014 
C 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
 
0.008 0.008 -0.002 
Crisis 
 
(0.0) (0.0)** (0.0) 
-0.002 
   crisis2 
(0.0) 
   
0.208 0.663 0.182 0.157 
dlog(debt) 
(0.1)* (0.3)* (0.2) (0.1) 
-0.127 -0.175 -0.128 -0.125 
dlog(G) 
(0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** 
-0.004 -0.082 -0.065 -0.005 
dlog(house_num) 
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
0.009 0.017 0.012 0.007 
Elect 
(0.0)* (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)* 
-0.015 -0.010 -0.007 -0.016 
top10 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
-0.013 -0.011 -0.009 -0.016 
bottom40 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
gov_time 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
-0.329 -0.402 -0.281 -0.268 
Residuals (-1)  
(0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** 
-0.661 -0.266 
 
-0.756 
dlog(GDP) 
(0.2)*** (0.2) 
 
(0.2)*** 
 
-0.672 -0.822 
 dlog(GDP)*(crisis) 
 
(0.7) (0.3)** 
 
0.149 0.778 
  dlog(GDP(-1)) 
(0.1) (0.2)*** 
  
 
-0.952 
  
dlog(GDP(-1)* 
(crisis(-1)) 
 
(0.3)*** 
  
-0.521* 
   dlog(GDP)*(crisis2) 
(0.3) 
   
0.152 
   
dlog(GDP(-1)* 
(crisis2(-1)) (0.3) 
   
0.20 0.11 0.16 0.18 AdjR² 
2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 D.W. 
(1) Using the world trade with one and two lags as an instrumental variable for the GDP and past values 
(with two lags) as instrumental variables for the debt and for government spending ; the regression 
includes the variables ELAST and LEGAL, which were not significant and are not reported for space 
considerations. 
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Table 6: Legal, Economic and Income Distribution Considerations During Crisis (1) 
(Standard Deviation in Parenthesis) 
 
1997q2 - 2009q3 Period 
Dependent Variable 
 
dlog(stat_ 
endo_total) 
dlog(stat_endo
_total) 
dlog(stat_endo
_total) 
dlog(stat_endo
_total) 
dlog(stat_endo
_total)) 
 
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
  
0.006 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.004 
C 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
-0.060 -0.005 -0.069 -0.065 -0.020 
dlog(DEBT) 
(0.0)** (0.0)* (0.0)** (0.0)** (0.0) 
-0.038 -0.037 -0.037 -0.038 -0.037 
dlog(G) 
(0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 d(macro_ 
index) (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)** 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.000 
Elect 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
-0.043 -0.041 -0.004 -0.043 -0.040 Residuals  
(-1)  (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** 
-0.090 -0.092 -0.087 -0.089 -0.101 
dlog(GDP) 
(0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** 
    
0.002 
crisis*legal 
    
(0.0)* 
   
0.004 
 crisis*elast 
   
(0.0)*** 
 
  
0.000 
  
crisis* 
house_num 
  
(0.0)*** 
  
 
0.011 
   
crisis* 
bottom40 
 
(0.0)*** 
   
0.010 
    crisis*top10 
(0.0)*** 
    
0.23 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.21 AdjR² 
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 D.W. 
(1) Using the world trade with one and two lags as an instrumental variable for the GDP, and past values (with two 
lags) as instrumental variables for the debt and for government spending; the regression includes the variables 
ELAST, LEGAL, dlog(HOUSE_NUM), GOV_TIME, TOP10 and BOTTOM40, which were not significant and 
are not reported for space considerations. 
 
